FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 22, 2003
Contact: Jonathan Adkins
(202)789-0942
Statement of Kathryn Swanson for the Governors Highway Safety Association (GHSA) before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Introduction
Good afternoon. My name is Kathryn Swanson, and I am the Director of the Minnesota Office of Traffic Safety and the Chair of the Governors Highway Safety Association (GHSA). GHSA is the national, nonprofit association that represents state and territorial highway safety offices (SHSO). Its members are appointed by their governors to design, implement and evaluate programs that affect the behavior of motor vehicle drivers, pedestrians, bicyclists and motorcyclists. As part of their responsibilities, GHSA members administer federal highway safety grant programs and penalty transfer programs. I appreciate the opportunity to share the Association’s thoughts with you on the reauthorization of these federal highway safety programs.
More than 42,000 people were killed and three million injured in motor vehicle-related crashes in 2002. Forty-two percent of those crashes were ones in which alcohol was involved. Nearly 5,000 pedestrians, more than 3,000 motorcyclists were killed and nearly 8,000 young drivers were killed in motor vehicle-related crashes. GHSA is very concerned, as are others in the highway safety community, that these numbers are beginning to move upward after several years of holding steady. With the present trend, no change in the risk of a fatal crash on a per population basis and no assumptions about future demographic changes, the absolute number of fatalities can conservatively be expected to increase to 63,513 by 2050 - an increase of 48% over current levels or approximately 350 additional fatalities every year.
The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) was designed to reduce these fatalities and injuries by addressing all aspects of highway safety - the roadway, the vehicle and the driver. My remarks will be limited to the areas that are the responsibility of GHSA members – the SHSOs - and will focus on the programs that address the behavior of the driver and other road users.
As enacted in TEA-21, the 402 program – the basic federal highway safety grant program through which every state receives funding – and the 410 alcohol incentive grant program were reauthorized. TEA-21 also authorized four new occupant protection incentive grants (the 405, 157 basic, 157 innovative, and 2003(b) programs); a second impaired driving incentive grant program (the 163 program); a data improvement program (the 411 program); and two penalty transfer programs, the 154 open container and the 164 repeat offender programs). The SHSO's are responsible for administering all of these programs.
Funding under the 402, 405, 410, and 2003(b) programs can only be used to address a variety of behavioral highway safety-related problems. The 411 funds can only be used to plan for the improvement of highway safety information systems. A state that is eligible for the 157 basic and 163 grants may use the funds for any purpose under Title 23 of the U.S. Code. 157 innovative funds can only be used for purposes specified by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in its annual announcement of the availability of grant funds. States that are not in compliance with the open container or repeat offender requirements may use the funds for impaired driving-related purposes or for activities under the Hazard Elimination Program.
Two years ago, GHSA embarked on an effort to evaluate the federal behavioral highway safety grant programs authorized under TEA-21. The results of that review were published last year in a report entitled Taking the Temperature of TEA-21: An Evaluation and Prescription for Safety which is available on GHSA's website, www.statehighwaysafety.org.
Our recommendations for the next reauthorization are based largely on the findings in our report. I would like to review several of them.
Safeguard Funding
Prior to TEA-21, highway safety grant programs were authorized at one level and almost always funded at a reduced level. SHSO’s never knew from year to year how much federal money would be appropriated, so it was difficult to plan, particularly for long-term multi-year projects, which are often necessary to see sustained behavioral changes.
TEA-21 changed that by creating budget firewalls around highway safety programs so that the funding could only be used for highway safety purposes. This has proved to be of tremendous benefit to the SHSO’s, who are responsible for administering federal grant funds. The firewalls have meant that there is a far greater degree of certainty in the state planning process than ever existed in the past. States know from year to year what to expect in terms of grant funding and they can better estimate the level of funding for which their states may be eligible. GHSA strongly supports the continuation of the budget firewalls for federal highway safety grant programs and believes that it should be the top priority for reauthorization.
States also want to retain the lead in determining how the federal grant funds should be spent in their states. Prior to 1994, states submitted annual Highway Safety Plans to NHTSA's regional offices. The regional offices reviewed and approved every single planned project. The plans were approved but often with a four- or five-page list of conditions and comments that the states had to meet if they wanted federal grant funding. SHSO's felt suffocated by the degree of federal oversight over, and micro-management of, very small federal highway safety grant programs.
In 1994, NHTSA piloted a change in the 402 program – the federal highway safety grant program that provides behavioral highway safety funding to every state. The new approach changed the program from one based on specific procedures into a more performance-based program. The performance-based approach was formally adopted by NHTSA in 1998. States are required to submit a Performance Plan in which they identify performance goals and objectives based on data-driven problem identification. The states then program their federal grant funding for projects that address the identified major safety problems in their states, typically impaired driving, adult occupant protection and child passenger safety. The projects are organized into an annual Highway Safety Plan that is reviewed but not approved by NHTSA. Most states also submit their plans for incentive grant funds as part of the annual Highway Safety Plan. Although TEA-21 added a number of new grant programs, federal oversight over those programs remained the same as under the 402 program.
The flexibility in the 402 program has allowed states to program their funds in the areas where they are most needed and has given the states the ability to control their own programs. States and NHTSA regional offices work more in partnership with each other rather than under the paternalistic relationship that existed prior to 1994.
Some of our close partners in the highway safety community have called for a return to the federal-state relationship that existed prior to 1994 in which NHTSA had approval authority over every aspect of state plans. GHSA would vigorously oppose such an approach. One safety group has suggested that under a new 402 program, if states do not meet certain performance standards within a specified time frame, then they would not be eligible for subsequent 402 funding unless they submitted to a NHTSA assessment to determine program weaknesses and identify program changes that will achieve desired results. Two groups also want the states to implement more uniform programs with similar safety messages from state to state.
GHSA strongly and completely opposes these approaches. Each state's needs, resources and priorities are different, and states should have the ability to use federal highway safety grant funds in a manner that best fits those needs, resources and priorities. SHSO's have had 37 years' experience implementing the Highway Safety Act of 1966 and have the skills and knowledge to undertake successful highway safety programs without heavy-handed federal oversight and micro-management.
Furthermore, NHTSA has sufficient existing oversight authority to compel states to improve their programs. NHTSA can conduct management reviews, require states to develop and implement improvement plans if they don't show progress after three years, and designate a state a high risk state if the state is not administering its federal highway safety grant funds appropriately. No additional oversight authority is needed. Rather, NHTSA needs to use this oversight authority in a consistent manner, as is recommended by the General Accounting Office.
GHSA and NHTSA are actively taking steps to improve the planning and management of state highway safety programs. GHSA, using its own resources, is developing a planning workbook and a template for state annual reports. Next year, we plan to develop a template for the annual state Highway Safety Plan which must accompany application for federal grant funds. We are also working with NHTSA to identify and seek state agreement on 12-15 performance measures which all states would use in setting goals and measuring performance. We have worked with NHTSA to develop the Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria (MMUCC) which is a guideline on what traffic crash data elements all states should collect.
GHSA is also working with NHTSA to develop explicit criteria under which a state program review would be triggered. These program reviews would occur if a state did not perform well or had difficulty reaching its goals. NHTSA and the state would then analyze the data and cooperatively develop a program enhancement plan.
GHSA firmly believes that NHTSA has sufficient oversight authority already and that the program review criteria will strengthen that authority. Further, we believe that the initiatives mentioned previously will enhance state planning efforts and move states toward a more data-driven, research- and performance-based approach to solving highway safety problems.
Create One Large Highway Safety Program
As noted previously, TEA-21 created eight separate incentive grant programs and two penalty programs, all of which are managed by SHSO's. Each of these programs has distinct eligibility criteria, separate applications and individual deadlines. This has meant that SHSO's have had to meet almost a deadline a month in order to apply for federal funds. Even keeping track of the different programs, eligibility criteria and deadlines has been a chore for both NHTSA and the states.
The net result of this proliferation of grant programs is that SHSO's are spending a large percentage of time trying to manage all the grant programs and meet varying programmatic deadlines instead of analyzing state data, implementing safety programs, forming new state and local highway safety partnerships, and evaluating program impact. State staff are stretched to the limit, and states are facing a high degree of staff burnout.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the explosion of programs has caused the federal approach to highway safety to be duplicative and very fragmented. There are four occupant protection programs and two impaired driving programs, each with a different purpose, scope and eligibility criteria. This has made it difficult for states to address the behavioral aspects of highway safety in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. Clearly, consolidation of grant programs is needed.
GHSA recommends that all of the incentive grant programs [402, 405, 410, 411, 163, 157 basic, 157 innovative, and 2003(b)] should be consolidated into one large highway safety grant program authorization. A portion of the funding should be for 402 grants for which every state is eligible. The remaining funding would be divided into an occupant protection tier and an impaired driving incentive tier - the two current national priority areas in highway safety.
Under the occupant protection incentive tier, states would receive funding if they enacted a primary belt law or increased their safety belt use rate. The program would be based, in large part, on the very successful 157 basic grant program. A portion of the funding in this tier would be set aside for states that did not meet either criteria. These funds would be used to help low-performing states implement innovative occupant protection programs that would boost their safety belt use rates. Unlike the current 157 innovative program, funds would be apportioned according to the 402 formula which would obviate the ability of NHTSA to place additional conditions on the innovative program funds.
Under the impaired driving incentive tier, states would have to meet a number of specific criteria, including a performance-based criteria, just as they do under the current 410 program. (The 410 program, authorized in 1991, has been one of the main sources of funding for state impaired driving programs and has contributed to low impaired driving rates.)
Under the impaired driving tier, the emphasis would be on programs that have been proven to be effective (such as graduated licensing and sobriety checkpoints or saturation patrols), on strengthening the judicial system's response to impaired driving, and on establishing systems that would allow a state to attack impaired driving in a comprehensive manner supported by good data. The program would be structured in a manner similar
The specific elements of both the occupant protection incentive tier and the impaired driving incentive tier are described in the attached GHSA safety grant program details.
The benefit of this approach is that there would be only one application deadline and one Highway Safety Plan. The management of the consolidated grant program would be far less burdensome for the states as well as for NHTSA. States would be able to address highway safety problems in a more coordinated, less fragmented manner, and would be able to better address the unique circumstances that exist in each state in reaching the identified goals.
Furthermore, the creation of incentive tiers would overcome some of the problems in the current incentive programs. The occupant protection and impaired driving incentive funds would be tied more closely to performance. Resources would be available to help low-performing safety belt use states. High-performing states would be rewarded for maintaining their superior performance. All states would be rewarded for enacting critical highway safety legislation such as primary safety belt laws or graduated licensing laws.
Continue Adequate Funding
TEA-21 authorized significantly more federal highway safety grant funding than the states received previously. With this funding, states have been able to implement many highway safety programs that have resulted in behavioral changes, contributing to the lowest fatality rate on record – 1.5 fatalities per 100,000 million miles of travel – as well as the highest national safety belt usage rate of 75 percent. Among other things, the additional funding has enabled states to greatly enhance their enforcement of safety belt laws; train more than 35,000 safety professionals in NHTSA's standardized child passenger safety curriculum; purchase radio and television time for safety messages; undertake underage drinking initiatives; and support programs addressing the needs of underserved and diverse populations.
With increased funding, states could put more resources into enforcement of traffic safety laws, particularly safety belt, speed and impaired driving laws. Better enforcement would help deter violations of traffic laws. Funds could be used to enhance staffing levels and to purchase new enforcement technology. Better enforcement would help convince populations that are resistant to traditional safety messages – such as the 25 percent of unbuckled drivers -- of the need for compliance.
With increased funding, states could also address a series of highway safety problems that are not being adequately addressed to date. The funds could be used to target the hard-to-reach populations (such as minority and rural communities) and at-risk populations (such as young males) that are less influenced by traditional highway safety programs and messages. With expanded funding, states could work to reduce pedestrian and bicycle fatalities that currently comprise one out of seven fatalities and motorcycle fatalities that have increased substantially five years in a row. Additional funds could be used to address the problems of older, aggressive and distracted drivers - all significant and growing highway safety issues. With increased funding, states could improve their emergency medical services (EMS) and incorporate new technologies into those services, thereby helping to reduce mortality and injury severity, particularly in rural areas. States could support more community-level highway safety programs. Additional funding could also be used to help incorporate safety into state and metropolitan planning and ensure that all aspects of safety – roadway, behavioral and motor carrier – are coordinated at the state level through performance-based statewide safety plans.
GHSA recommends that, at a minimum, $500 million should be authorized for the consolidated highway safety grant program - about $50 million above FY 2003 levels. Of that amount, $200 million should be authorized for the 402 program, $175 million should be authorized for the occupant protection incentive tier and $125 million should be authorized for the impaired driving incentive tier. Without adequate funding, it is clear that the increases in fatalities seen in 2001 and 2002 will continue.
The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) has recently issued reauthorization policy calling for the increase of federal safety funding - both behavioral and construction - by $1 billion per year. No new safety programs would be funded with the money; rather, the funds would be used to increase funding for existing safety infrastructure programs and for the proposed consolidated behavioral safety program. GHSA endorses this proposal and believes that it would provide the needed funding to conduct the safety activities outlined above.
If Congress determines a way to increase funding in the next reauthorization either through elimination of the gasohol subsidies, indexing the gas tax or other approaches, then a portion of that increase should be authorized for safety programs.
Support a Safety Data Grant Program
TEA-21 authorized a very small data improvement incentive grant program – the 411 program. The purpose of the grant program is to provide states with funding to improve their highway safety information systems (HSIS). Those systems are comprised of crash, hospital, driver licensing, citation, roadway and EMS databases. The 411 program provided funds for states to perform an assessment of their HSIS, form a traffic records coordinating committee with the state agency owners and managers of databases that comprise the state's HSIS, and develop a strategic plan for improving the state's HSIS. In FY 2002, 44 states, Puerto Rico, the Indian Nation and the four territories received 411 funding. No FY 2003 funding was authorized for this program under TEA-21.
The objective of the 411 program is a very limited one and, given that, it has accomplished its objectives very well. However, if the states are to implement the improvements identified in their traffic records assessments and strategic plans, then a large infusion of funds is needed. Hence, there is a need to create a new data incentive grant program that would fund hardware and software improvements, training, and implementation of new data collection, management and analysis technology.
From GHSA's perspective, improvements in highway safety-related data are critical. States use crash and other data to identify new and emerging highway safety problems, quantify the seriousness of existing highway safety problems, select appropriate countermeasures to address identified problems, monitor progress and evaluate the success of these countermeasures. If Congress wants to determine how states are performing, and to enact new programs based on performance, then improvements in state data capabilities are absolutely essential.
It is estimated that only 10 percent of law enforcement agencies have laptop computers from which crash data can be entered from the field. Until state crash data is entered electronically and there is linkage capability with the other safety-related databases in a state's HSIS, states will be forced to rely on inaccurate, untimely and inaccessible paper data systems with which to make important safety decisions.
Pennsylvania recently upgraded its crash data system at a cost of $6 million. If every state followed suit, it would cost an estimated $300 million. Hence, GHSA recommends that the data grant program should be authorized at $50 million a year over six years. Details of the grant program are discussed in the attached report.
Enhance Federal Highway Safety Research
Research has been a part of the federal highway safety program since its inception in 1966. Section 403 of the Highway Safety Act of 1966 authorized the use of federal funds to "engage in research on all phases of highway safety and traffic conditions." Section 403 also authorized cooperative agreements for the purpose of "encouraging innovative solutions to highway safety problems."
TEA-21 authorized $72 million for each of six years for the Section 403 research and development program. Of that amount, only $7 million was earmarked for driver and behavioral research in FY 2002. As a result of this low level of funding, many research needs are completely or partially unmet. States are compelled to implement programs for which there is not a strong research justification.
Currently, for example, there is a significant body of research on graduated licensing laws, per se impaired driving laws, repeat offender sanctions, primary safety belt laws, the impact of repealing motorcycle helmet laws, Selective Traffic Enforcement Programs (STEP's) and enforcement of safety belt laws. NHTSA is just completing a series of studies on distracted driving.
However, there is a significant gap in the current state of knowledge about most safety issues and the effectiveness of most safety countermeasures. Among other things, there is no current research on crash causation. The last crash causation study was conducted more than thirty years ago. There is little research on effective pedestrian, drowsy driving, or aggressive driving countermeasures, behavioral programs for older drivers, and community traffic safety programs. There is little research on effective ways to reach the minority community with highway safety programs. There is no research to determine why motorcycle fatalities have increased so dramatically in the last five years and whether motorcycle licensing and education have any impact on safety. There is no research on the effectiveness of countermeasures recommended in the Federal Highway Administration's Older Driver Design Handbook. There has been little research on the best way to improve the content of driver education programs for young and novice drivers. Very little research has been conducted on programs that reach the young adult drinking driver - those aged 21-34. There is little research on the impact of various safety messages and on the efficacy of enforcement programs other than STEP's. There is virtually no research on the interactive effects of combined roadway and behavioral improvements. In effect, there is considerably more research to be conducted.
The issue of open container legislation is illustrative of the need for further research. TEA-21 mandated that states enact open container legislation by October 1, 2000 (FY 2001) or have a portion of their highway construction funding transferred to the 402 program. However, no research had been conducted to determine whether open container legislation has any impact on impaired driving. In fact, NHTSA has only recently completed such research and has not broadly disseminated the results. Consequently, SHSOs have had to go before their state legislatures without research to support open container laws.
Additionally, there is no formal process by which highway safety research priorities are set. NHTSA researches issues that are of interest to the agency or are consistent with their national goals and program needs. State research needs are sometimes secondary, and states do not have a formal mechanism with which to provide input into the research agenda setting process. There is nothing comparable to the National Cooperative Highway Research Program for safety in which states, through the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, play a very strong role in determining research priorities.
GHSA recommends the federal driver and behavioral research program be expanded to $20 - $25 million a year and that an ongoing safety program should be authorized and modeled after the National Cooperative Highway Research Program. GHSA also recommends that the Future Strategic Highway Research Program (FSHRP) should focus, in part, on safety, including the behavioral aspects of highway safety. The safety funding under FSHRP should be used to undertake a comprehensive research program on crash causation and some of the funding should be used to evaluate the effectiveness of highway safety countermeasures.
Alter Lobbying Restrictions
In response to concerns raised by the motorcycle user community, Congress enacted new lobbying prohibitions in TEA-21 and in subsequent appropriations legislation. TEA-21 prohibits the use of federal funds for "any activity specifically designed to urge a State or local legislator to favor or oppose the adoption of any specific pending State or local legislation." Section 326 of the FY 2000 DOT Appropriations Act prohibits the use of federal funds for any activity "intended to influence in any manner a Member . . . of a State legislature to favor or oppose by vote or otherwise, any legislation or appropriation by . . . a State legislature . . . after the introduction of any bill or resolution in a State legislature proposing such legislation or appropriation."
NHTSA has interpreted these statutory provisions to mean that recipients of federal funds, including SHSO's and their grantees, cannot lobby on state legislation once the bill or resolution has been introduced in the legislative body. This means that SHSO's cannot advocate for safety legislation introduced by their governor or a state legislator. It also means that SHSO's cannot, after a bill or resolution is introduced, use federal funds to support state coalitions that have been formed to favor specific safety legislation. NHTSA policy also encourages SHSO staff to testify before a state or local legislative body only if there is a written invitation to do so.
These provisions have had a chilling effect on the advocacy activities of SHSO's. States no longer believe they can show support for any safety legislation, even if their own governors introduce it. Further, the provisions appear to be counterproductive. The 163, 405 and 410 incentive programs, the 154 and 164 penalty programs, and the .08 Blood-Alcohol Concentration (BAC) sanctions enacted after TEA-21 are all based on passage of state safety legislation. If states are going to qualify for the incentives and come into compliance with the penalties and sanctions, then they need the ability to affect state legislation.
GHSA recommends, at a minimum, that Congress should alter the lobbying restrictions to allow SHSO's and their grantees to lobby state legislatures on behalf of positions approved by governors and their administrations.
Continue Paid Advertising
Prior to TEA-21, NHTSA policy prohibited the use of federal highway safety funding for paid advertising. SHSO's were compelled to use public service announcements (PSA's) in order to implement their safety messages. While PSA's are less costly than paid media, they have limited impact because they are generally aired during off-peak times.
TEA-21 changed that by allowing the use of 402 funding for paid advertising for FY 1999 and 2000. (157 and 163 funds that were used for 402 purposes could also be spent on paid advertising.) Congress extended the permission to FY 2001, 2002, and 2003 as well.
The result has been that larger audiences view safety messages during prime time. Although there are scant evaluative data on paid advertising, there is ample anecdotal information that the state safety paid advertising is paying off. Further, there is supporting evaluation data from the FY 2001 safety belt enforcement effort in NHTSA Region IV (the southeastern region) and the FY 2002 safety belt enforcement demonstration program with thirteen states in which paid advertising was used. The combination of paid advertising and high visibility enforcement in that region resulted in significant increases in safety belt use under both of those efforts.
GHSA strongly supports paid advertising and recommends that its use continue to be allowed in the next reauthorization.
Avoid New Sanctions and Penalties
TEA-21 authorized two new penalty provisions (the 154 open container penalty and the 164 repeat offender penalty) but no new sanctions. Following TEA-21, Congress authorized a new sanction for states that fail to enact .08 BAC legislation.
There are currently 18 penalties and sanctions with which states must comply. Of those, seven are safety-related (minimum drinking age, drug offenders, use of safety belts, zero tolerance, open containers, repeat offenders and .08 BAC). Three of the seven have been enacted in the last six years.
GHSA and other state associations generally oppose sanctions and penalties for a number of reasons. Sanctions are not universally effective. Impaired driving-related sanctions appear to have strong public support and appear to work reasonably well. Other sanctions and penalties, such as those for the National Maximum Speed Limit and the mandatory motorcycle helmet legislation enjoyed little public support, were abysmal failures and were subsequently repealed.
Sanctions are often counterproductive. With fewer highway funds, the conditions of highways deteriorate and become less safe. Withholding funds only exacerbates the safety problem. Sanctions penalize the state broadly without specifically targeting the entity that perpetrated the safety problem. Since there is no clear relationship between the safety problem and the policy solutions (withholding of construction funds), states are not motivated to act.
TEA-21 encourages state agencies to work together to solve safety problems, but sanctions and penalties pull those agencies apart. The mandatory motorcycle penalties divided SHSO's from state Departments of Transportation (DOT's), causing them to oppose each other instead of working together toward enactment of motorcycle helmet laws. Opposition to the penalties by state DOT's contributed to their repeal. Similar friction has been felt by many SHSO's with respect to the open container and repeat offender penalties. SHSO's have been blamed for the TEA-21 penalties even though they were not responsible for their enactment. New penalties and sanctions make it harder for the SHSO's to work with state legislatures, even under the limited conditions allowed by TEA-21.
Frequent sanctioning by Congress makes states very resentful and less motivated to enact the requisite legislation. Some states will wait until the last minute and then enact legislation that is minimally acceptable in order to avoid the sanction, as has been the case with about a dozen states and the .08 sanction.
As former President Dwight Eisenhower said, "You do not lead by hitting people over the head - that's assault, not leadership." For the reasons outlined previously, GHSA recommends that no new sanctions or penalties be enacted.
Make Technical Changes to Current Penalties
TEA-21 requires states to enact, by October 1, 2000, repeat offender legislation or face the transfer of certain federal highway funding into the 402 program. For second or subsequent alcohol-related offenses, state law must require that: 1) the offender's license be suspended for not less than one year; 2) the offender's vehicle be subject to impoundment or immobilization or the installation of an ignition interlock; 3) the offender receives an assessment of the degree of alcohol abuse and treatment as appropriate; and 4) in the case of a second offense, the offender must receive not less than five days in jail or 30 days of community service and in the case of a third or subsequent offense, not less than 10 days in jail and 60 days of community service.
As of October 1, 2002, 32 states plus D.C. and Puerto Rico were in compliance with the repeat offender provisions. A number of states represented on this Committee -- Alaska, California, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, and West Virginia -- were among the states in non-compliance at that time. A number of technical problems with the repeat offender provisions contributed to the relatively low level of compliance.
One major problem concerns the license suspension provisions. NHTSA has interpreted the Section 164 language to mean that the mandatory minimum one-year license suspension must be a hard suspension with no hardship waiver or restricted license. Law enforcement officials are often reluctant to charge a repeat offender under those circumstances because they view the penalty as too harsh. Judges are also reluctant to give an offender a hard suspension because it would deprive a person of his/her livelihood for an entire year. Rural and indigent offenders would be especially impacted because they may be unable to arrange for alternate transportation, particularly transportation to treatment facilities. Offenders would have fewer resources to pay for interlock devices, impounded vehicles or treatment. State legislatures are often reluctant to enact the one-year hard suspension because it encourages repeat offenders to avoid the sanction by driving without a license. In fact, the driving-while-suspended problem is a growing one and is of increasing concern to both NHTSA and GHSA and its state members.
A related problem is that NHTSA regulations do not permit the installation of interlock devices until after the hard suspension period. Current research shows that ignition interlock devices are very successful in reducing recidivism when used in combination with restricted licenses, supervised probation and treatment. By delaying the use of interlocks, the NHTSA regulations do not allow the offender to drive to work or treatment, thereby increasing the risk of recidivism. The regulations are inconsistent with NHTSA's own research and show a misunderstanding of the purpose of the ignition interlock devices.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the NHTSA regulations do not place a time limitation on vehicle impoundment and immobilization. An offender's vehicle can be impounded or immobilized only for a few hours and then returned to the offender. As a result, the impoundment/immobilization sanction can be expected to have little impact on repeat offenders.
Another problem with the regulations is that the impoundment/immobilization/interlock sanction must apply to every vehicle owned by the offender. Hence, if an offender owns five vehicles, the sanction must apply to every vehicle. State legislatures are often reluctant to enact laws that would penalize car collectors and owners of fleets of vehicles. More importantly, the language encourages offenders to change the title of their vehicles to another family member in order to avoid the sanction.
GHSA recommends that the one-year suspension be changed to a limited hard suspension (e.g. 60 or 90 days) with a restricted license and imposition of an ignition interlock device during a subsequent restriction period. Further, there should be a time limit (e.g. 10-30 days) on the impoundment/immobilization sanction. The language requiring the sanctions to be applied to an offender's vehicles should be changed to the vehicle used by the offender.
The transfer provisions for both the open container and repeat offender penalties are also problematic. Non-compliant states have a portion of their Surface Transportation Program, National Highway System and Interstate Maintenance funds transferred into the 402 program. They can then use the transferred funds for impaired driving countermeasures or activities eligible under the Hazard Elimination Program (HEP).
Many states have lessened the impact of the penalty by using the transferred funds to supplement current HEP funding. Instead of budgeting for new HEP funding, the transferred funds are used. In effect, some state DOTs have played an elaborate shell game with the transferred funds. As a result, the penalty transfers have not motivated states to enact the requisite legislation.
The administration of the transfers has also been very difficult. Since all of the transferred funds must be transferred into the state's 402 account, the SHSO is responsible for administering them, even if all the funds are ultimately used for HEP purposes. In other words, there is no mechanism to retransfer funds used for HEP purposes into the state's HEP account. As a result, the small, overworked SHSO is financially responsible for overseeing the expenditure of HEP funds over which they have no programmatic control.
GHSA recommends that, if the transfer penalties are continued, the transferred funds only be used for impaired driving countermeasures. This would eliminate the administrative difficulties and would create a stronger "incentive" for states to enact the requisite legislation.
Comments on the DOT Reauthorization Proposal
Under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003 (SAFETEA), the Department of Transportation has proposed a three-part consolidated behavioral highway safety grant program. The proposed program includes basic formula funds, performance incentive funds, and a strategic impaired driving program. The performance incentive funds will be further divided into three types of incentives. In addition, DOT has proposed a separate data grant program and a very small EMS grant program. In FY 2004, total funding would be at the same level as FY 2003 NHTSA grant funding.
GHSA is pleased about some aspects of the funding request but very disappointed about several others.
The Association is pleased that DOT supported the idea of grant consolidation. A single grant program with one application and one deadline should be much easier to administer. GHSA is also pleased that the Administration is proposing performance incentive grants and increased funding for states that enact primary safety belt laws. The Association also supports performance-based incentives, particularly for states that enact primary belt laws, and has incorporated that concept into its own proposal. Clearly NHTSA heard and positively responded to the states' concerns in these areas.
GHSA strongly supports the proposed DOT data incentive grant program. The program funding level, the eligibility criteria, and the proposed use of grant funds are identical to those recommended by the Association.
GHSA supports the Section 151 (Title I) requirement that states coordinate their highway safety construction, behavioral and motor carrier grant programs and develop comprehensive, strategic highway safety goals. Future improvements in highway safety are not as likely unless states coordinate the disparate aspects of their highway safety programs.
GHSA supports the proposed funding for the crash causation study. As noted above, it has been about thirty years since such a study was conducted. If states are to improve driver and road user behavior, it is essential to know why crashes were caused. GHSA recommends, however, that the difference between the NHTSA crash causation study and the proposed FSHRP crash causation study need to be clarified and the studies coordinated.
GHSA also supports the proposed increased funding for the Section 403 program. However, it appears that most of the increase will be used for the crash causation study. Additional research resources must be directed to the NHTSA 403 program so that evaluation studies can be conducted on the effectiveness of a variety of safety countermeasures.
GHSA is extremely disappointed in the overall funding level for the behavioral safety grant programs. If safety is such a high priority for DOT, why wasn't behavioral safety grant funding increased more? How are the states to have an impact on the increasing number of fatalities and injuries without adequate funding? Why was the funding increase limited to the safety construction program? It appears that, once again, DOT's commitment to safety does not match its willingness to fund behavioral safety programs adequately. It will be no surprise if future years show further increases in motor vehicle-related fatalities and injuries.
GHSA finds the level of funding for the impaired driving program totally unacceptable. $50 million is considerably less than has been spent on impaired driving under TEA-21 and far less than is needed to adequately address this growing problem. Further, we believe that the program is too narrowly focused on a few states where an intervention would have the biggest impact. Impaired driving is a problem in every state, yet the proposal would provide no funds for the remaining, "non-strategic" states.
It is apparent that the proposed impaired driving program will be implemented in the same manner as the 157 innovative program. Under that program, NHTSA set very restrictive conditions on the grants and completely micro-managed the way eligible states expend funds. States have found the program very onerous and do not wish to repeat the experience under the proposed impaired driving program. In our view, the proposed strategic impaired driving initiative is more appropriate as a Section 403 demonstration program than as a state incentive grant program. We urge Congress to reject this proposal in the next reauthorization.
The Administration is proposing funding for three types of incentives – for enacting primary belt laws, for improving safety belt use rates and for improving performance. Each of these incentives will have their own eligibility criteria and their own earmarked funding. We are concerned that the performance incentive program may be just as complex as the myriad of programs that are currently authorized under TEA-21. As noted previously, GHSA urges that the goal in the next reauthorization should be simplicity and consolidation.
In the proposed primary belt law incentive grants, GHSA is very troubled by the distinction between states that enacted their primary belt laws during TEA-21 and those that enact them under SAFETEA. The former states are eligible for 1/2 of their FY 2003 402 apportionments over a two-year period. The latter are eligible for 5 times their FY 2003 402 apportionments.
GHSA believes that it can be very difficult for states to adopt primary belt laws, no matter when they enacted such laws, and that to make such a distinction is patently unfair. States that have primary belt laws should be rewarded for their superior performance and states wishing to enact such laws should be strongly encouraged to do so.
There are also some technical difficulties with the proposal. For one, if every eligible state enacted a primary belt law, there wouldn't be enough funding to give them the amount for which they would be eligible. If two or three large states enacted a primary belt law in one year, there wouldn't be enough funding in that year for any other states. States would have to wait one or more subsequent years, which may serve as a disincentive to states considering primary belt law passage.
SAFETEA also proposes that the performance incentive funds can be flexed into the safety construction program and vice versa. While GHSA members like funding flexibility, we have some major reservations about the proposed flexibility provisions. GHSA believes that the flexibility provisions may result in fewer - potentially far fewer - funds for behavioral safety grant programs.
States can flex all $100 million of their primary safety belt law incentive funds into the new Section 150 Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP). The intent of this flexibility is to encourage state Departments of Transportation to become involved in the passage of primary belt laws. While we support the involvement of state DOTs in the legislation, GHSA also believes that the language strongly encourages state DOTs to move funds into the HSIP in a kind of quid pro quo even though funding for safety construction is proposed to increase 54% over FY 2003 levels. According to the recent Government Accounting Office report, sixty-nine percent of the 34 states that were penalized in 2001 and 2002 used the money for HEP safety construction purposes and only thirty-one percent used the money for alcohol-related programs.
At the same time, GHSA believes that the flexibility provisions work against the passage of primary belt laws. DOT has proposed that, by FY 2005, states must enact primary belt laws or have 10% of their Section 150 funds transferred into the consolidated 402 program. However, states can flex 50% of their safety belt use rate incentives and 50% of their general performance incentive funds into the Section 150 program. As a result, the $100 million loss of safety construction funds can be partially offset by flexing $37.5 million of safety incentive funds into the HSIP. Hence, a state that fails to enact primary belt law legislation could have the impact mitigated to some extent by the flexibility provisions.
State DOTs can also flex 50% of the HSIP funds into the consolidated
safety program. However, there is always a need for safety improvements
to roadways, particularly for low cost improvements like rumble
strips, traffic control devices, lighting and pavement markings.
We see little possibility that the behavioral safety grant programs
would be the beneficiaries of the flexibility provisions. SHSO
experience with the open container and repeat offender penalties
have shown that flexibility provisions often pit one state agency
against another. The agency with the most political clout usually
determines how the penalty funds will be used. Hence, GHSA believes
that the flexibility provisions will result in less funding for
behavioral safety programs, not more. Consequently, we urge Congress
to reject the proposed flexibility language and simply allow
each safety program to be used for the purposes authorized.
This concludes GHSA's prepared statement on the reauthorization of safety
programs. Thank you for the opportunity to present our views and recommendations
on programs of utmost importance to its members. We look forward to working
with the members and staff of the Committee as they draft reauthorization language
in the coming months. Thank you again.
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GHSA responses to Senate Commerce
Committee Questions 
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The Governors Highway Safety Association (GHSA)® is a nonprofit association representing the highway safety offices of states, territories, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. GHSA provides leadership and representation for the states and territories to improve traffic safety, influence national policy and enhance program management. Its members are appointed by their Governors to administer federal and state highway safety funds and implement state highway safety plans. Contact GHSA at 202-789-0942 or visit www.ghsa.org.